Robert D. Aronson is a member of the board of the Jewish Community Relations Council of Minnesota and the Dakotas (JCRC). The views appearing in this article are personal to the author and are not for attribution to the JCRC or any other agency.
Given the sharp escalation of military action in Lebanon, the common perception is that we are seeing essentially a new phase of the war in Gaza. On both military fronts, Israel has taken military action against the existential threats to its survival and the safety of its population in response to attacks as initially launched by Hamas and then joined by Hezbollah a day later. So, there is certainly a shared motivation leading to the Israeli operations in the two areas.
But it is a false equivalency to regard Gaza and Lebanon as one and the same. In contrast to the situation in Gaza, there are a range of political, cultural, and religious factors in Lebanon that could constrain Hezbollah’s latitude to attack Israel and that might lead to a cessation of hostilities.
Basically, the escalation of Israeli action against Hezbollah creates a real possibility of achieving regional stability owing to one increasingly apparent reality: Iran, in serving as Hezbollah’s patron, has made a fatally bad investment that is counterproductive to Iran’s regional and strategic interests. If Iran pulls out of its support of Hezbollah, that terroristic organization will become degraded to a minor and ineffectual irritant to Israel’s security. If, sensing Hezbollah’s demise, Iran intervenes directly and more aggressively against Israel, it faces direct confrontation with the United States, a situation that Iran desperately desires to avoid.
Let’s examine some basic differences between Hamas and Hezbollah.
Hamas is the governing body of Gaza, which does not even exist as a country, but rather as a territory. Outside of Hamas, there is no governing body already in place in Gaza. As a consequence, there is no potential governmental peace partner for Israel in Gaza outside of a non-state terroristic group. In contrast, Lebanon has a civil, multi-religious government that was democratically elected in May 2022, although it functionally needs to share power with Hezbollah. While it is true that its civil government has been beset by severe economic and social problems, the unassailable fact is that there is an established albeit sclerotic body in place and that Hezbollah exists in a situation reminiscent of an unwelcome guest – that is, like the proverbial Aunt Bertha who never picks up the clues that it is time to leave.
Neither Hamas nor Hezbollah enjoys popular support. According to polling results released in June 2024 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, only 40% of Palestinians polled viewed Hamas as the desired governing party; a survey conducted between February and April 2024 by the Arab Barometer indicated that just 30% of the Lebanese population trusted Hezbollah to govern the country.
The question then concerns the impact of popular opposition to Hamas and Hezbollah. In the case of Gaza, there is realistically no room for popular dissent. Rather, Hamas is headed by an autocratic, fanatical leader whose rule has been marked by brutality toward Israelis, widespread murder and imprisonment of dissenting Palestinian citizens, a theological certainty about its mission, and a willingness to sacrifice its citizens as a strategic imperative. In contrast, there is vastly increased latitude for public political expression in Lebanon. From 2019-2021, Lebanon witnessed mass demonstrations that allegedly involved up to 3 million participants – which is 25% of the population – protesting government corruption and pointing the finger at Hezbollah’s interference in Lebanese politics. While this is hardly an endorsement of good government, it attests to a tradition of political expression and popular involvement that impacts and constrains unchallenged governmental action given that there is still some measure of accountability to the populace.
The demographics of Gaza and Lebanon also differ greatly. Gaza is much more homogeneous as 99% of its population is Muslim and 80% trace their lineage to their departure from Israel in 1948 when Israel became a Jewish state. Gaza has never been an independent country, which is relevant in that is lacks a tradition of self-governance, the rule of law, and a secular cultural tradition. Hamas has largely embraced “Jihad,” which is a religiously infused commitment to defend Islam from the infidel, such as Jews. In contrast, Lebanon has a religiously diverse population in which 40% of its citizens are Christians and the Muslim community is split between its Shiite and Sunni wings. There is a historical tradition of cultural and religious diversity that inextricably carries with it a greater commitment to secular compromise and religious tolerance.
The strategies of resistance in Gaza and Lebanon differ sharply with enormous impact on the prospects for concluding hostilities. As noted in an excellent profile of Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader, by David Remnick that appeared in the August 3, 2024, issue of the New Yorker, a core element of Hamas’ military strategy is the sacrifice of its own citizens to Israeli reprisal attacks precisely in order to galvanize international public opinion against Israel – a cynical, inhumane policy that violates shamelessly international law. In contrast, there is no corollary in Lebanon to engage in the same scorched earth, self-immolating, and ideologically driven doctrine. Lebanon has demographic diversity, a tradition of democratic pluralism, a history aligned with Western traditions, and a resistance to religious extremism. These factors presumably constrain unfettered action by Hezbollah.
So, what does all this mean for peace, stability, and security in the Middle East? First, it means that Israel in Lebanon is not facing a fanatical country that has enshrined martyrdom of its population as a central strategy. Rather, there is a prospective peace partner in Lebanon in the democratically elected Lebanese civil government that will hopefully invoke rationality rather than blind ideological fervor in assessing peace initiatives. Second, recent events have suggested that Hezbollah is an ineffectual partner for Iran’s proxy war with Israel. Hezbollah’s leadership has been decimated, its fighting force decimated, its technological capabilities degraded, and its existence as a positive contributor to Lebanon debunked. Iran is faced with either cutting ties with Hezbollah – perhaps to return another day – or more directly confronting Israel militarily, a situation most likely leading to war with the United States, which is a situation that Iran desires to avoid at all costs.
